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Words That Wound: Defining, Discussing, and
Defeating Bankruptcy "Corruption"
A. MECHELE DICKERSON t
INTRODUCTION

"Corruption" is a powerful word, which may explain
why the typical reaction to Courting Failure' begins, and
often ends, with a passionate discussion of whether
bankruptcy judges are corrupt. Many respond to the book
by attacking the author's integrity because they perceive
the book as an unfair attack on the integrity of the
bankruptcy bench. It is unfortunate that the discourse over
bankruptcy venue for large corporations has been so
personal because it creates an atmosphere that makes it
virtually impossible to rationally discuss the topic.
Moreover, in such an atmosphere, the accuracy and
usefulness of LoPucki's raw data or statistical runs is
largely discounted, overlooked, or just plain ignored because
of the controversy over the politically loaded term
"corruption."
This Article attempts to re-characterize the notion of
"corruption" and then briefly discusses some of the
conclusions LoPucki reaches that could be fairly criticized.
The Article then departs from a strict review of LoPucki's
book by arguing that one way to decrease the undeniably
corrupt management practices that caused the downfall of
the large firms discussed in Courting Failure is by giving

t Fulbright & Jaworski Professor of Law, University of Texas. I thank
Professor William Whitford for inviting me to participate in this symposium. I
also thank Professors Lynn LoPucki and Jay Westbrook for commenting on
earlier versions of this Article. This project was funded, in part, by a grant
provided by William and Mary School of Law, and I thank my friends and
former colleagues at William and Mary for their kindness and support during
the last ten years.
1. LYNN M. LoPUcKI, COURTING FAILURE: How COMPETITION FOR BIG CASES IS
CORRUPTING THE BANKRuPTcY COURTS (2005).
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DEFINING CORRUPTION

One reason Courting Failure has been so controversial
is because of LoPucki's decision to use, yet imprecisely
define, the term "corrupt." Indeed, the strongly negative
reaction to the book's premise (and to the author) results2
from the negative connotations associated with that term.
While corrupt has several meanings, most people likely
perceive that it means to become tainted, rotten, morally
debased, or to change from good to bad in morals, manners,
or actions. 3 LoPucki never explicitly defines corrupt that
way, but instead appears to define corruption as the process
whereby courts first decide to "change what they are doing
to make themselves more attractive to forum shoppers"4
and, then, fail to apply the law to the facts of the case.
Even this definition is problematic because adopting new
procedures and making rulings that may not be favorable to
some creditors simply does not equate to being rotten or
morally depraved.
Bankruptcy judges, like all judges, are often required to
interpret or apply murky rules of procedure. Not
infrequently, they must choose which seemingly conflicting
rule or procedure they should apply. That a bankruptcy
court (or district) adopts new, streamlined procedures (like
the ones originally used only in the Delaware courts) in
response to criticisms that its existing procedures are
inefficient or otherwise discourage attorneys from filing
large cases in the court/district does not mean that any
individual judge is corrupt or cannot still apply the law to

2. See Charles J. Tabb, Courting Controversy, 54 BUFF. L. REV. 467, 469-71
(2006) (chronicling criticisms of the book and its author).
3. See WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY 313 (3d ed. 1988). Common
synonyms for corrupt include: debauched, decadent, degenerate, degraded,
depraved, perverse, perverted, reprobate, and warped. Other words that come
to mind when the term is used include: crooked, cutthroat, dishonest, unethical,
unprincipled, unscrupulous, contaminated, evil, immoral, nefarious, sinful, and
wicked. Id.
4. LOPUCKI, supra note 1, at 137.
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the facts. 5 Moreover, this definition of corruption assumes
that all of the Delaware procedures courts adopted (like
approving fee applications with national billing rates) and
the rulings competing courts made in large cases (like
approving key employee retention plans) are inconsistent
with the Bankruptcy Code ("Code") or the bankruptcy rules.
Since the author chose the word "corruption," and
sincerely believes that this wounding word is the correct
one to use, 6 having a fuller-and perhaps more nuanceddefinition would have avoided some of the vitriolic attacks
on the book and its author. Another common definition for
corrupt could have been used to describe current Chapter
11 practices without creating such an uproar: to alter from
the original or correct form or version. 7 Few would argue
that the Chapter 11 process now (with significantly more
363
sales, Chief Restructuring
Officers ("CROs"),
examiners, and concentrated large case filings in New York
and Delaware) functions the same way it did in 1978 or
even 1998. Thus, even if Delaware and New York cases do

5. Delaware procedures that were adopted by "competing" courts include
providing omnibus hearings to facilitate the schedules of out-of-town lawyers,
hearing first-day matters on the first day, and increasing predictability by
issuing memos that explain how particular matters will be handled. See id. at
79.

6. LoPucki analogizes the process whereby court competition drives
professional fees up (not down) to the increased costs associated with providing
a bribe to a corporate purchasing agent. See id. at 141. This likely did not help
endear the author to his critics. See also Lynn M. LoPucki, "Corruption"Is the
Right Word, BCD NEWS & COMMENT, July 19, 2005, at 23 ('Corrupt' is an
accurate description of both the choices and the judges who made them.")
7. Computer software programs routinely use the term "corrupt" in error
messages. when I used a dial-up internet service (NetZero), I frequently got the
following error message: 'Your copy of the NetZero software has been corrupted.
Please reinstall the software in order to correct this problem." I did nothing to
corrupt the software. Indeed, after my first (long and arduous) reinstallation of
the software, I realized that I could just ignore this message, log on, and surf
the web notwithstanding the purported "corruption." Corruption in this sense is
also used to describe copies of medieval manuscripts. Because there were no
printing presses in the Middle Ages, whenever someone needed a copy of a
printed work, a scribe would need to copy it out by hand. This caused textual
variations since the scribes would make mistakes or would deliberately add or
remove text. See Bella Millett, Mouvance and the Medieval Author: Re-Editing
Ancrene Wisse, in LATE-MEDIEVAL RELIGIOUS TEXTS AND THEIR TRANSMISSION:

ESSAYS IN HONOR OF A. I. DOYLE, 9-20 (A. J. Minnis ed., 1994); see also
http://www.soton.ac.uk/-wpwt/mouvance/mouvance.html; httpJ/rrp.stanford.edu/
project.html. I thank my colleague, Emily Kadens, for this observation.
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not have higher filing rates because of competition, or if
every bankruptcy judge is a virtuous, dedicated public
servant, few would dispute that large Chapter 11 cases now
are different from the ones originally envisioned by
Congress.
It is not surprising that judges and bankruptcy
practitioners alike have taken offense to the use of the term
"corrupt" because it has such negative overtones that
LoPucki could have neutralized by offering a full and
precise definition. If LoPucki had defined and used the term
corrupt to mean change, rather than crooked, he likely
would have avoided the emotional grief, while at the same
time remaining consistent with his findings and
conclusions.
II. CRITIQUE OF COURTING FAILURE
A. Probabilitiesv. Certainties
Because so many of his empirical findings are quite
powerful, it is unfortunate that, at times, LoPucki makes
assertions that would be better couched as probabilities.
The book examines both things that can be empirically
shown (what judges have done) and things involving human
behavior that cannot be empirically proven (why judges do
what they do). LoPucki occasionally makes assertions that
either are not or cannot be empirically supported. Likewise,
he occasionally posits what would have happened if the
judge in a particular case had not taken a certain course of
action that he characterizes as participating in the
competition.
For example, LoPucki suggests that judges want highprofile cases because they want to work with the best
bankruptcy professionals and attain the status, power, and
"celebrity" associated with presiding over a high-profile
case.8 While this may be true, it cannot be empirically
proven.9 Similarly, LoPucki asserts that the managers of
8. LoPucKI, supra note 1, at 20.
9. Cf. Gregory Mitchell, Tendencies Versus Boundaries:Levels of Generality
in Behavioral Law and Economics, 56 VAND. L. REV. 1781, 1797-98 (2002)

(noting that discussions of how people act requires some recognition of
"individual or situational variation in behavior ....
). Moreover, suggestions
that judges would willingly ignore the law simply to solicit an invitation to
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Enron, Global Crossing, and Adelphia would have suffered
a much harsher fate if a trustee had been appointed
because the trustee would have demanded that the corrupt
managers return funds to the company. 10 Empirical data
certainly can prove that judges in New York and Delaware
rarely appoint trustees in large cases (or appoint them less
than judges in non-competitive venues). While this data
might suggest that the courts' reluctance to appoint
trustees creates an appearance of impropriety or bias, the
data do not prove that the judges in fact acted improperly
or were biased. Likewise, the data cannot prove what would
have happened if a trustee had been appointed nor can the
data prove why judges may have decided not to act or rule
in a certain way. Despite this, LoPucki states that court
competition "had precluded that solution [appointing a
trustee]" because judges would not dare appoint a trustee
and risk having the case placers refuse to place large cases
in their courts.1 1
While that might be true, those courts rationally could
have decided to focus on reorganizing or restructuring those
companies rather than overseeing a trustee's attempts to
sue the directors or officers because of their corrupt
conduct. Moreover, because many of the officers and
directors were being investigated by numerous state and
federal agencies, and had been sued, 12 it was not
speak at a luxury resort or because they want to shape their obituary before
they die provides fodder for the supporters of the current (lax) venue laws.
LoPucki, supra note 1, at 20 ("When a bankruptcy judge dies, the obituary will
likely mention the big cases over which the judge presided-assuming, of
course, there were any."); see also American Bankruptcy Institute's 7th Annual
New York City Bankruptcy Conference-Venue Debate (May 9, 2005),
http://abiworld.org/Content/NavigationMenu/NewsRoom/ResearchCenter/LoP
uckiVenueDebate atNewYorkCityConference/LoPuckiVenueDebateat
_NewYorkCityConference.htm (last visited Apr. 11, 2006).
10. LOPUCKI, supra note 1, at 150.
11. Id. at 13-14, 151.
12. See Ben White, WorldCom Ex-Leaders Reach Deal in Lawsuit, WASH.
POST, Mar. 19, 2005, at El (discussing $55.25 million class-action settlement
involving eleven former WorldCom directors and $168 million settlement
involving Enron directors). See generally In re Adelphia Commc'ns Corp., 327
B.R. 143 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005) (approving settlement between debtor, United
States Department of Justice, the Securities and Exchange Commission, and
members of the family of Adelphia's founder and former CEO). As a result of
shareholder lawsuits and other litigation in Enron, banks and investment firms
have agreed to pay more than $8 billion to settle lawsuits or regulatory
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unreasonable for the courts to focus on the firm instead of
the firm's former managers. 13 In short, while it is possible
that the New York bankruptcy courts refused to appoint a
trustee to avoid being viewed as "toxic," there is an equally
plausible explanation for their behavior
that has nothing to
do with competition or corruption.' 4
B. The Evils of Forum Shopping
LoPucki concedes that forum shopping exists in all
courts and that there are multiple reasons for venue
shopping in bankruptcy cases. 15 While forum shopping is a
practice that is disfavored by the courts and widely

complaints. See Bob Keefe, AOL Thrns Spam Loot Into Prizes Via Lawsuit,
AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN, Aug. 17, 2005, at C1. In addition, a number of Enron
and WorldCom officials have either been charged with crimes or sentenced to
jail because of various crimes related to their fraudulent activities involving
those firms. See Alexei Barrionuevo, 2 Enron Chiefs are Convicted in Fraudand
Conspiracy Trial, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 2006, at Al (discussing Lay and Skilling
convictions); Leon Lazaroff, Ebbers Found Guilty, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 16, 2005, at 1
(discussing Ebbers' conviction and pending trials of Enron's Ken Lay and
Jeffrey Skilling).
13. Congress responded to the failure to appoint a trustee in these highprofile cases by giving the United States Trustee the authority to move for the
appointment of a trustee if the debtor's officers or directors "participated in
actual fraud, dishonesty, or criminal conduct in the management of the debtor
or the debtor's public financial reporting." 11 U.S.C. § 1104(e) (2000), amended
by The Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005,
Pub. L. No. 109-8, § 1405, 119 Stat. 215.
14. Similarly, LoPucki states that courts are "slow to interfere" with certain
363 sales that he characterizes as self-dealing because the court "needs the
support of the case placers to maintain its flow of new cases." LOPUCKI, supra
note 1, at 139. Again, while this is one explanation, courts might also have
approved such sales because no one objected to them. LoPucki also states that
certain judges were not reappointed because they refused to join the
competition. Id. at 21-22, 44. While the people the author interviewed (many of
whom presumably demanded confidentiality) may be able to prove that
statement, LoPucki does not. Likewise, LoPucki states that case placers
prevented future cases from being filed in New York after a judge there
appointed a trustee in the Eastern Airlines case. Id. at 58. Again, while it may
be possible to prove this, LoPucki fails to do so.
15. Shoppers seek good judges who are familiar with large reorganizations,
venues that are convenient to debtors' counsel, and judges who will rule
favorably on fee applications, motions to extend exclusivity, and other matters
important to the case placers. Id. at 39-40.
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condemned by commentators, 16 it is an established part of
the adversarial process and some would argue that an
advocate who fails to engage in forum shopping exposes
himself to a malpractice claim. 17 Certainly, courts should
not actively compete for cases by making rulings that are
contrary to the law. Yet, it is not unusual for a court's
docket to change after it adopts procedures used in other
courts. For example, the Eastern District of Virginia was
long known as the "rocket docket" because of the
streamlined procedures it used, especially involving
discovery.' 8 Attorneys in intellectual property (IP) cases
often chose to file in that district because of the short length
of time the cases would take to go to trial.' 9 Once other
courts adopted similar procedures, lawyers began
to forum
20
shop and file IP lawsuits in those courts as well.
LoPucki seems to suggest that forum shopping outside
of bankruptcy cases is significantly different, and his biting
criticism of bankruptcy courts would suggest that those
courts are under a greater duty to restrain shoppers than
are federal district or state courts. 21 That is, unlike the
bankruptcy courts' purportedly competitive behavior,
LoPucki maintains that non-bankruptcy courts are not

16. See, e.g., Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 538 (1992) ("Forumshopping is thus of particular concern."); Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff
& Assocs., 483 U.S. 143, 154 (1987) (discussing potential dangers of forum
shopping); Mary Garvey Algero, In Defense of Forum Shopping: A Realistic Look
at Selecting a Venue, 78 NEB. L. REV. 79, 80 (1999); Kevin M. Clermont &

Theodore Eisenberg, Exorcising the Evil of Forum-Shopping, 80 CORNELL L.
REV. 1507, 1507 (1995).

17. Alan B. Morrison, Removing Class Actions to Federal Court: A Better
Way to Handle the Problem of Overlapping Class Actions, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1521,
1524, 1530 (2005).

18. See Jerry Markon, A Double Dose of Molassas in the Rocket Docket,
WASH. POST, Oct. 3, 2004, at C4.

19. See Saundra Torry, On the Fast Track with Alexandria's 'Rocket Docket,'
WASH. POST, Dec. 10, 1997, at F7.

20. See Tresa Baldas, IP Hotbed-For Now, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 20, 2004, at 26;
Steven E. Bizar & Paul D. Weiner, Arbitration is Not Always Quick, NAT'L L.J.,
Nov. 17, 2003, at 23 (discussing the Eastern District of Virginia's reputation as
a "rocket docket" and listing courts that adopted similar efficient procedures);
Helen Coster, Harvesting IP Gold in East Texas, AM. LAW., Aug. 2003, at 52;
Glen A. Ousterhout, Proposinga Post-Grant Review, NAT'L L.J., Jan. 24, 2005,
at S1.
21. LOPUCKI, supra note 1, at 137.
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attempting to attract cases and may not know that forum
shopping is taking place. 22 He also asserts that these other
judges are not issuing rulings that are contrary to existing
law or ratcheting up what they are willing to offer simply to
cater to certain lawyers. 23 That is, of course, possible. It is
hard to imagine, however, that judges who have an increase
in certain types of cases filed in their courts after they
adopt procedures used in courts that are known to hear
those cases have no idea why those cases suddenly
appeared in their courts. The media regularly reports forum
shopping involving certain jurisdictions 24 and notes that
some courts have adopted procedures to make them
"unique" and (one assumes) attractive to certain litigants.
One wonders whether lawyers involved in those cases
wouldn't also contend that these courts are making certain
rulings or otherwise engaging in at least a subtle form of
competition to get (or keep) certain cases. 25
It is possible (maybe even likely) that some bankruptcy
courts adopted certain procedures to signal that they would
offer case placers the same "deal" that Delaware and New
York courts purportedly offered. But, bankruptcy courts
could have also adopted those procedures because they
genuinely believed the adoption was needed to make case
22.
23.

Id.
Id.

24. See Nathan Koppel, Lone Star Rising, AM. LAw., Mar. 2004, at 67, 70;
Kenneth J. Parsigian, LEGAL OPINION LEITER, Foreign Nations' Tobacco Suits
Don't Belong in U.S. Courts, June 23, 2000. For a particularly humorous forum
shopping opinion involving a case transferred from the federal district court
that encompasses Brazoria County, Texas, see Republic of Bol. v. Philip Morris
Cos., 39 F. Supp. 2d 1008 (S.D. Tex. 1999) ("the Court is virtually certain that
Bolivia is not within the four counties over which this Court presides, even
though the words Bolivia and Brazoria are a lot alike and caused some real,
initial confusion until the Court conferred with its law clerks. Thus, it is readily
apparent, even from an outdated globe such as that possessed by this Court,
that Bolivia, a hemisphere away, ain't in south-central Texas, and that, at the
very least, the District of Columbia is a more appropriate venue (though Bolivia
isn't located there either).").
25. Pamela MacLean, Gang Case Challenges Broad Discovery Rules, THE
RECORDER, Aug. 24, 2005, at 1 (a criminal defense counsel suggested that the
Eastern District of Virginia has certain policies that are pro-government and
that, in the rocket docket, "the government holds great sway, and judges let
them run rampant over the defense."); see also Charles S. Fax, Specialized
Court Starts to Operate, NAT'L L.J., July 28, 2003, at 19; William C. Smith, Md.
Panel Urges Biz Court, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 27, 2000, at B1.
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filings more efficient. In any event, the fact that one district
would adopt procedures used in, and publicized by, another
district is not uncommon and is not improper even if the
adopting/competing court suddenly became popular with
certain litigants. While bankruptcy judges obviously should
not issue rulings that are contrary to the law, the fact that
they adopt procedures used in other courts and, in the
process, attract new cases to their courts makes them no
more corrupt than the federal district courts who engage in
the
as
long
as
Moreover,
practices.
similar
adopting/competing courts continue to apply the law that is
binding in their circuit, it is not clear why they should be
deemed corrupt simply because they are being competitive.
C. Telling a Coherent Story
LoPucki bolsters his principal contention that the
bankruptcy courts are engaging in competitive behavior by
attempting to make every court decision or action fit neatly
into the competition story. In so doing, he either ignores or
downplays actions that courts or case placers made if those
actions were inconsistent with the competitive theory. For
example, LoPucki never explains why the Houston judge
26
would not have "fought" to keep the Continental case, if
courts so desperately want big cases. 27 Nor does he explain
why the New York judge would have made such a "bad"
ruling in the LTV case, since one would assume the judge
28
knew that such a ruling would displease the case placers.
Similarly, LoPucki states that the judge in the Kmart case
was too embarrassed to rule that certain managers could
keep certain bonuses, which makes little sense if competing
judges will really do anything to keep the case placers
happy. 29 Likewise, assuming it is true that case placers
avoided New York because of its lottery system, 30 it makes
26. LoPUcKI, supranote 1, at 60-62.
27. It is possible that his decision to concede defeat to Delaware pre-dated
the start of the true competition.
28. LoPuCKI, supranote 1, at 68.
29. Id. at 154.
30. LoPucki argues that case placers preferred filing cases in Delaware
because the New York courts used an unpredictable lottery system to assign
cases to judges. Id. at 75. LoPucki also suggests that it was widely known that
the New York lottery was rigged in favor of one particular judge. Id. at 46-47. If
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no sense that they would continue to favor Delaware after
the district court revoked the automatic reference and
caused cases to be decided randomly by both district court
judges and visiting bankruptcy judges. 3 1 LoPucki also does
not convincingly explain why the Delaware district court
judges issued rulings to ensure that Delaware remained a
favored bankruptcy venue. 32 Most district court judges
presumably do not lie awake at night dreaming of ways to
increase their bankruptcy docket. Moreover, LoPucki does
not present any evidence that these district court judges
generally are corrupt or otherwise were competing to get
certain types of cases in their courts. Indeed, unless they
are just competitors at heart (which could be the case), or
they receive some type of a kickback, it is unclear why these
district courts would compete so aggressively for
bankruptcy cases.
Finally, a main theme of LoPucki's book is that
competitive courts are reluctant to appoint a trustee for fear
33
of being blacklisted or being branded a "toxic" court.
Indeed, LoPucki crucifies the New York courts for their
failure to appoint trustees in Enron, Global Crossing,
Adelphia, and WorldCom. These courts get no credit,
however, for appointing examiners, CROs, or fee
examiners/committees. LoPucki also fails to mention
whether parties other than the case placers sought the
appointment of the examiners or fee committees or
participated in the selection of the CRO. Nor does he
explore in depth what benefits these entities added to the
cases 34 or why the case placers would not have reacted
true, this ostensibly gave New York the same predictability that Delaware
offered. See id at 75.
31. Id. at 88.
32. Id. at 87, 95-96.
33. Id. at 14, 23, 250.
34. The longest discussion of examiners involves the Enron examiner,
though the discussion generally is limited to presenting the examiner's findings
(ostensibly to prove that a trustee was needed to pursue actions against the
former managers) rather than explaining whether the court's decision to
appoint an examiner was consistent with the competition theory. See id. at 149.
Likewise, LoPucki does not indicate whether the CRO in Enron (Steven Cooper)
added any value to the case and, instead, portrays Cooper as a lackey picked by
Lay to ensure that no one went after Lay or other Enron executives. While
LoPucki states that Cooper owed his job, and thus his allegiance, to Lay, he
does not provide any evidence to prove that Lay facilitated Cooper's hiring or
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negatively to these appointments and, consequently,
branded those judges as toxic. If case placers really pick
courts based solely on whether the court will protect the
managers and generally let the managers and lawyers have
their way in cases, then they should have stopped placing
cases in New York after the Enron judge appointed the
examiner who performed a voluminous investigation 35 or
after the judges in Enron and WorldCom appointed CROs
(who largely displaced the managers). Likewise, even if
LoPucki's characterization of fee examiners/committees
(that they fail to control professional fees) is correct, it is
hard to imagine that the case placers would be happy 36
with
a judge who appointed someone to scrutinize their fees.
D. Reasonable Minds Might Differ
As long as there is judicial discretion, there will be a
perception of abuse. Rather than suggesting that certain
court practices create an appearance of impropriety or
abuse, LoPucki flatly declares that competition has
corrupted the bankruptcy courts. 37 In fact, LoPucki appears
unwilling to acknowledge that reasonable, non-corrupted
minds might differ about the legitimacy of the practices he
condemns and brands as unlawful.
Bankruptcy courts fairly could be criticized for
approving a fee application that is bloated (i.e., double or
over billing), has too many lawyers on the case, or includes
excessive expenses. 38 But, LoPucki seems to criticize courts'
routine approval of fee applications simply because the
that Cooper's future employment as a CRO depended on what actions he took
(and refused to take) against Lay. Id. at 11, 146. Fee examiners/committees are
briefly mentioned when LoPucki suggests (but does not explain in detail) that
they (like courts) also do not control professional fees. Id. at 143.
35. For a discussion of the examiner's work (and fees) in Enron, see David
Barboza, Lawyer Proves a Thorn for Enron's Partners, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21,
2002, at Cl; Carrie Johnson, Enron Bankruptcy Examiner's Fees Soar, WASH.
POST, Dec. 30, 2003, at El.
36. If, as LoPucki suggests, the court "that got Enron-and handled it to the
satisfaction of the Enron lawyers and executives who chose the court-would
get many more," it is especially surprising that a court that wanted to remain
competitive would appoint either an examiner or a fee committee to scrutinize
the managers' or lawyers' behavior. LoPUCKI, supra note 1, at 9.
37. Id. at 137-81.
38. Id. at 1.
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lawyers requested their national, customary billing rates. 39
The fact that courts refuse to impose fee caps is not a per se
indication that they are corrupt. In fact, most courts,
United States Trustee's offices, and a growing number of
academic commentators have concluded that national law
firms should be compensated at their customary billing (i.e.,
the national) rates rather than the rates charged in the
area where the case is filed. 40 Similarly, while paying
"critical vendors" is a highly controversial practice that may
have gotten out of control at times, a court's decision to
allow such payments may not be motivated solely by its
desire to remain competitive. Indeed, even the Seventh
Circuit's opinion in the Kmart case, which is highly critical
of critical vendor payments,
does not categorically bar such
41
payments in bankruptcy.
LoPucki also criticizes judges (especially those in New
York and Delaware) for failing to perform a true feasibility
analysis in cases-especially in "prepackaged cases." 42 It is
not clear, however, what judges should do if they are
presented with uncontroverted evidence that supports
feasibility. It would be odd to require judges, sua sponte, to
reject uncontroverted evidence in large cases or to routinely
appoint an examiner in such cases to consider the plan's
feasibility if the evidence is uncontroverted. Similarly,
LoPucki criticizes courts for approving 363 sales at
purportedly inadequate prices. 43 He does not sufficiently
explain, however, what courts should do if there are no
objections to the sale. He also fails to consider that the

39. Id. at 44, 141-43.
40. See In re Taxman Clothing Co., 49 F.3d 310, 315-16 (7th Cir. 1995); In
Busy Beaver Bldg. Ctrs., Inc., 19 F.3d 833 (3d Cir. 1994) (permitting lawyers
charge bankruptcy clients the same fees paid by non-bankruptcy clients); In
Atwell, 148 B.R. 483, 488-89 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1993); Ayer, et al., Basics

re
to
re
of

ProfessionalRetention and Compensation, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Feb. 2005, at 1;

Hon. Roger M. Whelan, et al., Professional Compensation Reform: New Ideas or
Old Failings, 1 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 407 (1993). Moreover, disputes over
whether lawyers should be paid at their full market rate or at a reduced rate
are not limited to bankruptcy cases. See, e.g., Jim Chen, The Price of
Macroeconomic Imprecision: How Should the Law Measure Inflation?, 54
HASTINGS L.J. 1375, 1418 (2003).
41. In re Kmart Corp., 359 F.3d 866 (7th Cir. 2004).
42. LoPuCKI, supra note 1, at 107.
43. Id. at 167-80.
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number of 363 sales at inadequate prices may be increasing
because of syndicated loan debt, claims trading, and vulture
investors-market factors that are beyond the control of
bankruptcy judges.
Finally, it is not clear that courts' decisions to approve
retention plans were based solely on their desire to remain
competitive. As an initial matter, bankruptcy courts
essentially inherited the bloat of corporate retention
programs because, as LoPucki notes, this practice existed
and thrived outside of bankruptcy. 44 It is plausible that
courts concluded that refusing to approve such plans would
give competent, non-corrupted managers an incentive to
abandon the firm once it entered bankruptcy. 45 Moreover,
though Congress has now substantially limited the amount
of pre-petition compensation managers can retain as
retention bonuses 46 or loans, it did not ban retention
payments outright.
E. The Controversy Clouds the Data
The controversy over the word "corrupt" and LoPucki's
inability to support his claims about judges' motivations
with empirical data has led many to overlook a troubling
trend involving bankruptcy cases that may now be
exacerbated by recent amendments to the Code. Many
Chapter 11 critics argue that "faster is better" because
creditors are harmed the longer a company remains in
bankruptcy. 47 LoPucki's data suggests, however, that the
opposite conclusion is more accurate.
LoPucki's discussion of the phenomenally high refiling
rate of prepackaged bankruptcies 48 belies the notion that it
is always more efficient for cases to be resolved quickly.

44. Id. at 152-53.
45. See A. Mechele Dickerson, Approving Employee Retention and Severance
Programs: Judicial Discretion Run Amuck?, 11 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 93

(2003) (discussing factors courts consider when approving retention plans).
46. See 11 U.S.C. § 503(c) (2000), which limits a court's ability to allow
insiders to keep retention payments.
47. See generally A. Mechele Dickerson, A Behavioral Approach to Analyzing
Corporate Failures, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1, 30-33 (2003) (discussing

criticisms of lengthy Chapter 11 cases).
48. LoPUCKI, supranote 1, at 160.

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

378

[Vol. 54

Indeed, whether one agrees with LoPucki's claim about the
effect that competition has on prepackaged plans (i.e., that
courts refuse to critically examine prepacks for fear of being
labeled a toxic court), it is hard to dispute the data on the
significantly higher rate of refilings for prepackaged
49
plans-especially plans filed in Delaware and New York.
Recent revisions to the Code do not explicitly expand a
debtor's ability to file a prepackaged plan. However,
Congress clearly intended to make it harder for cases to
remain in Chapter 11 for prolonged periods of time. That
these recent amendments 50 are consistent with the "quicker
is better" mantra is cause for concern because there appears
to be little data to support that mantra. Moreover,
LoPucki's data show that shorter bankruptcy cases
(whether prepackaged or not) tend to fail at higher rates
than cases that remained in bankruptcy for longer periods
of time. 51 The controversy over the term "corrupt" has,
unfortunately, prevented any meaningful discussion of this
conclusion or what (if anything) bankruptcy courts can do to
slow down a case that is proceeding too quickly.
III. DEFEATING OFFICER AND DIRECTOR CORRUPTION
Not even LoPucki's most unforgiving critics can
reasonably dispute his claim that many of the large, recent
bankruptcy cases have involved corporate scandals of
"unprecedented magnitude" that "struck the American
economy" at the beginning of this decade. This claim is
undeniable, regardless of one's view of purportedly corrupt
bankruptcy judges, the need for revised venue rules, or the
high refiling rates in Delaware and New York. 52 One
possible solution to several of the bankruptcy court
practices that LoPucki views as corrupt is to give directors
better incentives to protect firms from corrupt managers.
49. Id.
50. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 1121(d)(2) (2000), amended by Pub. L. No. 109-8,
119 Stat. 106, 113 (2005) (limiting a court's ability to extend the exclusivity
period in all cases). Special time limits have also been placed on small business
filings. See 11 U.S.C. § 1121(e) (2000), amended by Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat.
106, 113 (2005); 11 U.S.C. § 1129(e) (2000), amended by Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119
Stat. 113, 216 (2005).

51. LOPUCKI, supra note 1, at 117-18.
52. Id. at 145.
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Reasonable minds might reach differing conclusions
concerning whether the Enron, Adelphia, or WorldCom
courts should have appointed a trustee. No reasonable mind
could disagree that the directors of those firms failed to
detect, and ultimately prevent, the abuses that occurred
pre-petition. Why or how directors failed to detect or
prevent fraud has been asked numerous times 53 (well before
Courting Failure was published), and the answers most
often given are not unrelated to LoPucki's corruption
theme: greed, laziness, and incompetence.
Some corporate directors may just be greedy, lazy,
incompetent, 54 or otherwise incapable of understanding the
complexities of the financial transactions they are asked to
approve. 55 However, it is hard to believe that all corporate
directors are corrupt or that greed, sloth, or incompetence
alone would cause people with impeccable business
credentials to consistently, systematically, or intentionally
53. See, e.g., Patrick McGeehan, Guard Dogs Without Teeth: Fund Scandal
Puts Focus on Trustees, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2003, § 3, at 1 (questioning how
"accomplished trustees" were blind to illegal acts committed by the founder and
then chair of a major mutual fund); Larry D. Thompson, Senior Fellow, The
Brookings Inst., Chautauqua Inst. Lecture: The Corporate Scandals, Why They
Happened and Why They May Not Happen Again (July 13, 2004),
http://www.brookings.edu/views/speeches/thompson/20040713.htm.
54. See W. Steve Albrecht, et al., Fraud and Corporate Executives: Agency,
Stewardship and Broken Trust, 5 J. FORENSIC ACCT. 109, 123 (2004); Zipora
Cohen, Directors'Negligence Liability to Creditors:A Comparative and Critical
View, 26 J. CORP. L. 351, 359 (2001) (discussing incompetent management);
Charles M. Elson, Director Compensation and the Management-Captured
Board-The History of a Symptom and a Cure, 50 SMU L. REV. 127, 163 (1996)
(suggesting that management's ability to decide which directors get to consult,
or how much to give to the director's charity of choice as "side-bribes"); Jeffrey
N. Gordon, What Enron Means for the Management and Control of the Modern
Business Corporation: Some Initial Reflections, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1233, 1242
(2002) (discussing "'soft conflicts,' such as significant charitable contributions to
an institution where a director may have a strong affiliation .... ");Reed
Abelson, One Enron Inquiry Suggests Board Played Important Role, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 19, 2002, at Cl; Steve Kichen & Eric S. Hardy, CorporateAmerica's Most
Powerful People, FORBES, May 25, 1992, at 174 (discussing "boards of directors
that shirk their job of holding the boss to account.").
55. For example, notwithstanding their financial sophistication, the Enron
board overall appeared not to understand the economic rationale of some
transactions nor the consequences or risks of those transactions. WILLIAM C.
POWERS, JR. ET AL., REPORT OF INVESTIGATION BY THE SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE
COMMITTEE OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF ENRON CORP. 23-24 (2002)

[hereinafter POWERS REPORT], available at http://files.findlaw.com/news.
findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/enron/sicreport/sicreport020102.pdf.
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harm a company. Such a facile explanation is implausible
because directors of corporate boards value prestige and
status and
are alleged to be highly reputationally
56
sensitive.
When faced with corporate scandals or directorial
misconduct, legislators typically respond by proposing or
enacting laws that increase directors' civil or criminal
liability, or they mandate additional disclosures. 57 Such a
response likely will not prevent future harm if the scandals
were caused because corrupt directors could reap enormous
financial gains or because otherwise fit directors
unintentionally made bad decisions. 58 Likewise, the typical
legislative response will not remove unfit (but not
hopelessly corrupted) directors who intentionally make bad
decisions.
After briefly describing directors' duties and potential
liabilities under existing laws, the remainder of this Article
explains why these laws do not adequately protect firms
from
corrupt
directors
or
from
directors
who
unintentionally harm firms. The Article argues that to
56. See Jayne W. Barnard, Reintegrative Shaming in CorporateSentencing,
72 S. CAL. L. REV. 959, 967-68 (1999). Enron directors included Wendy Gramm
(former Chair of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission and wife of the
then Senator Phil Gramm), Lord John Wakeham (a former leader of the British
Houses of Commons and Lords), Robert K. Jaedicke (the former Dean of
Stanford Business School), and Paulo Ferraz Pereira (a former bank president).
See Abelson, supra note 54, at C1. Similarly, WorldCom's directors included
Judith Areen (the then Dean of Georgetown Law School), Carl J. Aycock (former
Secretary and CFO of Master Corporation), Max E. Bobbitt (former president
and CEO of Metromedia China Corporation), and Gordon S. Macklin (former
president of the National Association of Securities Dealers). See Seth Schiesel,
Most of Board at WorldCom Resign Posts, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 2002, at C7.
57. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745
(codified in scattered sections of 15, 18 U.S.C.) [hereinafter Sarbanes-Oxley
Act]; Mutual Fund Investor Confidence Restoration Act of 2003, S. 1971, 108th
Cong. (2003); Mutual Fund Investor Protection Act of 2003, S. 1958, 108th
Cong. (2003); Mutual Fund Transparency Act of 2003, S. 1822, 108th Cong.
(2003); Mutual Funds Integrity and Fee Transparency Act of 2003, H.R. 2420,
108th Cong. (2003).
58. For criticisms of the limitations of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, see John C.
Coffee, Jr., What Caused Enron? A Capsule Social and Economic History of the
1990s, 89 Cornell L. Rev. 269, 304-05 (2004); Larry E. Ribstein, Market vs.
Regulatory Responses to CorporateFraud:A Critique of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
of 2002, 28 J. CORP. L. 1, 47 (2003) (suggesting that the regulatory responses to
corporate fraud "are unlikely to do much good and may do harm."). But cf.
Thompson, supra note 53.
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protect firms from corrupt or undeniably unfit directors
(i.e., the greedy, lazy, or incompetent directors) and to
decrease any pressure bankruptcy judges may feel to allow
corrupt managers to continue to control firms in
bankruptcy, the directors of all insolvent firms
presumptively should be deemed "unfit" and barred from
serving on current or future boards.
A. The Role of the Board of Directors
1. Legal Duties. Corporate directors have a duty to
avoid self-dealing (i.e., the duty of loyalty) and a duty of
care. They breach the duty of loyalty when they participate
in a self-interested transaction or otherwise place their own
interests ahead of the firm's interest. 59 The duty of care
requires directors to act diligently and prudently in
managing the firm's affairs and to avoid making irrational
or harmful decisions. Though the duty of care primarily
focuses on harmful decisions directors make, it also
requires directors to act if due attention would prevent a
loss. 60 In duty of care lawsuits, courts evaluate the
information available to the directors, the harmful decision,
and the good faith or rationality of the process they used to
make the harmful decision. 61 Directors who are sued for
breaching the duty of care because they failed to prevent a
loss generally can defend against that claim if they relied
on information or opinions provided by firm employees,
lawyers, and accountants, and have no reason to believe
that such reliance is unwarranted. 62
Directors who breach their fiduciary duties may be
fined. Lawsuits alleging that directors breached the duty of
loyalty tend to be more successful than those alleging duty

59. Ledbetter v. First State Bank & Trust Co., 85 F.3d 1537, 1540 (llth Cir.
1996); Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985).
60. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858. See generally William T. Allen et al.,
Realigning the Standardof Review of Director Due Care with Delaware Public
Policy: A Critique of Van Gorkom and Its Progeny as a Standard of Review
Problem, 96 Nw. U. L. REV. 449 (2002).

61. See supra note 60.
62. MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.30(d)-(e) (2002).
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of care breaches 63 primarily because allegations that a
director breached the duty of care are reviewed under the
highly deferential business judgment rule. That is, unless
the plaintiff proves that the directors acted in bad faith,
directors generally will not be held liable for decisions they
made if they used a rational, deliberately considered
decision-making process.6" Moreover, because many states'
corporate charters protect directors from civil liability for
failing to monitor the firm's activities, 65 the business
judgment rule, until recently, ensured
that successful suits
66
against directors would be rare.

2. Removing Directors Who Breach Duties. Courts
generally will not remove even corrupt directors from

63. See, e.g., Daniel R. Fischel & Michael Bradley, The Role of Liability
Rules and the Derivative Suit in Corporate Law: A Theoretical and Empirical
Analysis, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 261, 290-91 (1986).
64. The business judgment rule is designed to encourage directors to freely
exercise their managerial discretion and to remove uncertainty from corporate
transactions by avoiding an ex post appraisal of the managers' decisions. See
Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, 634 A.2d 345, 360 (Del. 1993); Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d
at 871, 873. Indeed, some suggest that this rule essentially eliminates liability
in duty of care litigation. See, e.g., ROBERT CLARK, CORPORATE LAW § 3.4 (1986)
(suggesting that mere mention of the rule brings a smile of relief to directors'
faces); Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of
Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247, 299-300 (1999) ("[I]n practice the duty of
care is all but eviscerated by a legal doctrine known as the 'business judgment
rule."'); Alan R. Palmiter, Reshaping the Corporate Fiduciary Model: A
Director's Duty of Independence, 67 TEX. L. REV. 1351, 1361-62 (1989) ("Courts
accord near-complete deference to corporate decisions untainted by interest... !).
65. Largely in response to Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (interpreted to
significantly expand the director liability for breach of duty of care), states
adopted "charter option" statutes that allowed corporations to include
exculpatory clauses in their articles of incorporation that protected directors in
breach of due care lawsuits. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2003); see
also Fred S. McChesney, A Bird in the Hand and Liability in the Bush: Why
Van Gorkom Still Rankles, Probably, 96 Nw. U. L. Rev. 631, 649 n.73 (2002)
(discussing states' adoption of charter option).
66. For example, in 2001, a total of 483 shareholder suits were filed in the
United States, an increase of 282 over the number filed in the previous year.
See PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS LLP 2001 SECURITIES LITIGATION SURVEY 1,
http://www.pwc.com/gx/cfr/investigations/pwc-securitieslitigationstudy_200l.pd
f. While securities class action filings have declined since 2001, early case
dismissals have slowed considerably and there have been record-breaking
settlements. See JOSEPH ALLERHAND & PAUL FERRILLO, WEIL, GOTSHAL &
MANGES LLP, SECURITIES LITIGATOR SURVEY (2003-2004), httpJ/www.weil.com
hvgm/cwgmhomep.nsf/fles/SecuritiesLitSurvey03-04$file/SecuritiesLitSurvey 03-04.pdf.
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current board service unless a statute specifically
authorizes the removal. 67 State court judges have the
authority to remove directors in more than half of U.S.
states. 68 These statutes allow courts to remove directors if
they find that directors engaged in fraudulent or dishonest
conduct, grossly abused their position, intentionally
inflicted harm on the corporation, were unable or unwilling
to follow corporate directives or to transact business on
behalf of the company,
or if removal is in the best interest of
69
the corporation.
Federal law also gives courts and agencies the
authority to remove unfit directors. 70 The most well known
debarring statute is the Securities Enforcement Remedies
71
and Penny Stock Reform Act of 1990 (the "Remedies Act"),
which gives courts the power to temporarily or permanently
bar directors from serving as an officer or director of a

67. See Harkey v. Mobley, 552 S.W.2d 79 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977). But see Brown
v. N. Ventura Rd. Dev. Co., 216 P.2d 227 (Cal. Ct. App. 1963) (suggesting that a
court would have the authority to remove directors without explicit statutory
authority because they hold positions of trust). See generally Olga N. SirodoevaPaxson, Judicial Removal of Directors: Denial of Directors' License to Steal or
Shareholders'Freedomto Vote?, 50 HASTINGS L.J. 97, 102-03 (1998).
68. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 10-2B-8.09 (2003); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 33-743
(2003); HAW. REV. STAT. § 414-199 (2003); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 30-1-809 (2003);

805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/8-35 (2003); see also Sirodoeva-Paxson, supra note 67, at
104 n.29. Most state statutes are based on the Model Business Corporations
Act. See MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.09 (2002).
69. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 10-2B-8.09(a); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 33-743(a); HAW.
REV. STAT. § 414-199(a); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 30-1-809(1); 805 ILL. COMP. STAT.

5/8-35(b); MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.09(a) (2002); see also Jayne W. Barnard,
When is a Corporate Executive "Substantially Unfit to Serve?," 70 N.C. L. REV.
1489, 1495-96 n.35 (1992) (citing cases).
70. For example, certain federal banking agencies can remove bank
directors or officers if the removal is needed to protect the interests of the
federally insured depository banking system. See 12 U.S.C. § 1818 (2000),
amended by Pub. L. No. 109-173, 110 Stat. 3605, 3611 (2006) (granting the
power to debar a bank official who has engaged or participated in any unsafe or
unsound practices); 12 U.S.C. § 2264(b) (2000) (granting the power to debar
certain officials involved with the farm credit system if they caused substantial
financial loss or other damage); 7 U.S.C. § 499b (2000); 7 C.F.R. § 46.35 (2003)
(granting the power to suspend, revoke or terminate the license of directors of
firms who willfully and repeatedly violate the Perishable Agricultural
Commodities Act).
71. Securities Enforcement Remedies and Penny Stock Reform Act of 1990,
Pub. L. No. 101-429, 104 Stat. 931, 933, 935 (1990) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. §§ 77t(e), 78u(d)(2)).
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public company if (1) the director has violated certain
federal securities laws, 72 (2) the SEC shows that the
director engaged in fraudulent or deceptive conduct, and (3)
this fraudulent
conduct establishes the director's
"unfitness" to serve as a corporate officer or director. The
following factors generally are applied when deciding
whether a director is unfit: the magnitude or egregiousness
of the underlying violation; whether the director has
violated securities laws or breached fiduciary duties as an
officer or director in the past; the director's role in the
fraudulent conduct; the degree of the director's scienter in
connection with the violation; the amount the director
gained from the violation; the likelihood of renewed
misconduct;
and, the director's appreciation of his fiduciary
73
duties.
Unfortunately, state and federal removal statutes fail
to adequately protect firms from corrupt or otherwise unfit
directors or give courts or agencies the authority to remove
well-meaning directors who unintentionally harm firms.
For example, though state courts can prevent an unfit
director from being reelected for a period prescribed by the
court, 74 they generally are unwilling to do so unless they
conclude that the director is completely incompetent or is
physically or mentally incapacitated. 75 In addition, state
removal statutes (and the judicial interpretations of those

72. See 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)(1) (2000) (making it unlawful for any person to
"employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud .... "); 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b)
(2000) (making it unlawful for any person to use "any manipulative or deceptive
device or contrivance in contravention" of SEC rules and regulations).
73. Though the term "unfitness" is not defined, many courts have adopted
factors initially suggested in a law review article written by Professor Jayne
Barnard. See Barnard, supra note 69, at 1492-93; see, e.g., SEC v. First Pac.
Bancorp., 142 F.3d 1186 (9th Cir. 1998); SEC v. Patel, 61 F.3d 137, 141 (2d Cir.
1995); SEC v. Robinson, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 91,948 (S.D.N.Y. July 16,
2002). The Sarbanes-Oxley Act eliminates the "substantial" showing and now
permits a bar based on any showing of unfitness. Federal courts are likely to
continue to apply these same factors because the body of law that already exists
evaluates directors' fitness based on these factors. Sarbanes-Oxley Act, supra
note 57, at § 305 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78u(d)(2), 77t(e)).
74. MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.09(c) (2002); see also ALA. CODE § 10-2B8.09(b) (2003); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 33-743(c) (2003); HAW. REV. STAT. § 414199(b) (2003); IDAHO CODE Ann. § 30-1-809(2) (2003); 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/8-

35(b)(2) (2003).
75. Barnard, supra note 69, at 1496-97.
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laws) fail to clearly or consistently articulate when removal
is appropriate, and courts often fail to coherently define the
type of misconduct that warrants removal. 76 Since a court is
not likely to remove a director who thinks he is acting in
the best interest of the firm, a director who believes that his
decisions and his decision-making process benefit the firm
has no reason to fear being removed from the board even if
his decisions or decision-making process are flawed.
Moreover, the director risks-at most-removal from only
current board service because the state statutes do not give
courts the authority to prevent the unfit director from
joining another board.
Like the state removal statutes, federal laws also are of
limited use in protecting businesses. The federal removal
statutes apply only to public banks or federally-regulated
entities and, thus, offer no protection for the shareholders
or creditors of private businesses. Moreover, because the
Remedies Act has a scienter requirement, directors who
make bad decisions but do not intend to harm the business
could not be barred from current or future board service
even under the law widely viewed as the strongest
debarment statute.
Many question the competence of courts to make
decisions that could (and arguably should) be made by
private actors.7 7 However, relying on shareholders to
76. For example, New York authorizes courts to remove directors and
officers if the case is brought by the attorney general or by a shareholder that
owns 10% of the outstanding shares. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW §§ 706(d), 716(c)
(McKinney 1986 & Supp. 1998). California, however, provides for judicial
removal of directors only in suits brought by shareholders that own 10% of the
outstanding shares. CAL. CORP. CODE § 304 (West 1990). Some older decisions
allowed even corrupt shareholder-directors to reelect themselves as directors.
See Atkins v. Hughes, 282 P. 787, 790 (Cal. 1929) (allowing shareholders who
were controlled by fraudulent directors to continue to reelect the fraudulent
directors); Remillard Brick Co. v. Remillard-Dandini Co., 241 P.2d 66, 77 (Cal.
Dist. Ct. App. 1952) (stating that the court will not remove directors for acts
committed during their tenure in office if they are subsequently reelected by the
shareholders).
77. In general, shareholders have the authority to remove directors with or
without cause unless the articles of incorporation provide for removal only for
cause. MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.08(a) (2002); see also Jayne W. Barnard, The
Securities Law Enforcement Remedies Act of 1989: Disenfranchising
Shareholders in Order to Protect Them, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 32, 45 (1989)

(discussing whether the forced removal of directors or officers is consistent with
the view that "judges are ill-suited to evaluate managerial competence."); Ralph
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remove corrupt or otherwise unfit directors is unlikely to be
effective due to the problems just discussed. Shareholders
also will find it hard to remove corrupt or unfit directors
because of the difficulty and expenses associated with both
acquiring information about a director's prior board service
and with mounting a campaign to prevent an arguably unfit
78
director from sitting on a board frustrates the problem.
Moreover, as the next section shows, because some directors
may make bad decisions, but are not corrupt in the morally
debased sense of the term, existing laws are especially
unlikely to give them an incentive to make better decisions
(including a decision to better monitor corrupt officers).
B. BehavioralInfluences on Directors
Insights from the behavioral law and economics
literature may help explain why otherwise competent and
well-meaning directors may unintentionally make bad
decisions. 7 9
Psychological
studies8 0
suggest
that
overconfidence is a common human tendency, and that
highly successful
people are especially likely to
overestimate their ability to control their environments and

A. Peeples, The Use and Misuse of the Business Judgment Rule in the Close
Corporation, 60 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 456, 457 (1989) ("Application of the
[business judgment] rule requires judicial deference to corporate decisions and
thus non-interference by the court.").
78. Removing corrupt directors is unlikely to increase notwithstanding the
obligations imposed by the very law that was enacted in response to the
corporate scandals at the beginning of this decade (the Sarbanes-Oxley Act)
because this legislation does not require businesses to give shareholders
additional information about a potential director's past board service. Given
this, it will continue to be burdensome, expensive, and rare for shareholders to
successfully remove corrupt or unfit directors.
79. I am not suggesting that all directors have psychological biases. Instead,
I suggest that the law must confront the insights provided by behavioral studies
both to determine whether psychological biases cause directors to unconsciously
make decisions that harm the business and to consider whether a nontraditional legal sanction is needed to help directors overcome those biases.
80. Though this section of the Article cites sources that rely on psychological
studies, I am not suggesting that those studies were designed to replicate, in a
controlled laboratory experiment, the behavior of directors. Instead, I cite to the
behavioral traits identified in these studies to suggest that reasons other than
greed, sloth, or incompetence may cause directors to make poor decisions and
that failing to consider these traits when considering laws designed to penalize
certain conduct may decrease the laws' effectiveness.
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to prevent harm.81 The problem of the "overconfidence bias"
is well-documented and, over the last few years, has been
explored in detail in the law and behavioral science
literature.8 2 An actor is susceptible to this bias if he
believes that the likelihood that a negative event will
happen to him is less than the likelihood that it will happen
to someone else, or if he thinks that it is more likely that a
positive event rather than a negative event will happen to
him. The overconfidence bias causes people who are
actually informed of the likelihood of harm to make
incorrect decisions and appears even in sophisticated actors
who know the actual probability distribution of an event.8 3
People also have a tendency to take credit for the good
things that happen in their lives but deny responsibility for
the bad events that occur. They tend to attribute positive
outcomes to their own personal qualities, while negative
84
outcomes are attributed to bad luck or exogenous factors.
Similarly, most people, especially successful ones, have an
enhanced sense of their ability to control events in their
lives and often assume that people fail or are otherwise
unsuccessful only because they are lazy or have a

81. See Donald C. Langevoort, The Human Nature of Corporate Boards:
Law,

Norms,

and the

Unintended

Consequences of

Independence and

Accountability, 89 GEO. L.J. 797, 807 (2001).
82. See Christine Jolls, Behavioral Economics Analysis of Redistributive
Legal Rules, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1653 (1998); Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S.
Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption from
Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1051 (2000); Marleen A. O'Connor, The

Enron Board: The Perils of Groupthink, 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 1233 (2003).
83. See Jolls, supra note 82, at 1659 nn.22-23 (citing studies); Korobkin &
Ulen, supra note 82, at 1091-93 (citing psychological studies); Jeffrey J.
Rachilinski, The "New" Law and Psychology: A Reply to Critics, Skeptics, and
Cautious Supporters, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 739, 758 (2000); Cass R. Sunstein,
Behavioral Analysis of Law, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1183 (1997) (discussing

common behavioral biases). Thus, regardless of a person's educational level or
social status, if he is susceptible to the overconfidence bias, he likely will make
bad decisions. At least one source suggests that overconfidence is dominantly a
male trait which, if true, would suggest that the trait is even more likely to
affect boards which remain largely male. See Brad M. Barber & Terrance
Odean, Boys will Be Boys: Gender, Overconfidence, and Common Stock
Investment, 116 Q. J. ECON. 261 (2001).
84. See SHELLEY E. TAYLOR, POSITIVE ILLUSIONS: CREATIVE SELF-DECEPTION
AND THE HEALTHY MIND 16 (1989).
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questionable work ethic.8 5 This tendency, combined with
the overconfidence bias, encourages people to accept too
many risks based on their belief that adverse results are
unlikely to occur and, even if a bad event does occur, they
have the power to prevent any resulting harm.8 6 Since
directors are well educated and have succeeded
professionally (perhaps because of their willingness to take
overconfident
greater risks), they may be more likely to be
87
about their ability to make correct decisions.
Behavioral studies also suggest that people make "path
dependent" choices. That is, once people form a certain
belief, they often become inattentive to new information
that contradicts that belief.8 8 With their prior beliefs and
decisions as an "anchor," people become overcommitted to
those decisions even if subsequent information suggests
that they should question the earlier decisions.8 9 Likewise,
because anchoring causes present decisions and choices to
be constrained by prior decisions, people often attempt to
justify and rationalize the continuing validity of prior

85. See id. at 25; see also Robert A. Hillman, The Limits of Behavioral
Decision Theory in Legal Analysis: The Case of Liquidated Damages, 85
CORNELL L. REV. 717, 723 (2000); Robert K. Rasmussen, Behavioral Economics,
the Economic Analysis of Bankruptcy Law and the Pricingof Credit, 51 VAND. L.
REV. 1679, 1689 (1998).
86. See Hillman, supra note 85, at 723.
87. See Donald C. Langevoort, Taming the Animal Spirits of the Stock
Markets:A BehavioralApproach to Securities Regulation, 97 Nw. U. L. REV. 135,
146 (2002) (suggesting that "[i]llusions of control and overoptimism are
associated with a variety of positive outcomes: greater willingness to take risk,
more persistence in the face of adversity, etc." and that being "unrealistically
confident, within moderation, can lead to greater success, even if it also leads to
more mistakes as well.").
88. Matthew Rabin, Psychology and Economics, 36 J. ECON. LIT. 11, 26
(1998). This might also explain why some bankruptcy judges may have
continued to approve of certain practices (like paying "critical" vendors ahead of
other unsecured creditors or approving overly generous retention bonuses
plans) even after the chorus of critics suggested that those practices were not
justified under existing laws.
89. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Why a Board? Group Decisionmaking in
CorporateGovernance, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1, 5 (2002) (noting that "many directors
of large corporations are outsiders who have full-time jobs elsewhere" and have
little time to devote to running the company); Langevoort, supra note 81, at
811.
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decisions even though an objective observer would question
the reasonableness of those decisions.9 0
Behavioral studies also indicate that most actors have
the tendency to cut corners and make quick decisions on too
little information if they genuinely believe their decisions
ultimately will lead to a successful result, and they think
that reasonable people would make the same decision. 9 1 An
overconfident group, like a board of directors, also may
engage in "groupthink" especially if the board is fairly
cohesive. Groupthink occurs when the group's solidarity is
challenged by an external influence, and the group
responds by closing ranks and clinging to a collegial status
92
quo rather than attempting to respond to the challenge.
Of course, recognizing that behavioral biases may affect
directors' abilities to make sound business decisions does
not explain how laws should be revised to respond to those
biases. At a minimum, considering those biases will help
explain why competent, well-meaning directors may

90. See Rabin, supra note 88, at 26 (noting that 'fresh' thinkers may be
better at seeing solutions to problems than people who have meditated at length
on the problems, because the fresh thinkers are not overwhelmed by the
'interference' of old hypotheses."). A similar bias, called the "optimism
commitment whipsaw," prevents people from abandoning a failing course of
action. Instead, it causes them to take even greater risks to further the
committed course of action. Even if the decisions were good ones when
originally made, the unwillingness to re-evaluate those decisions ultimately
causes harm once an unexpected event occurs (such as a downturn in the
economy). See Donald C. Langevoort, Seeking Sunlight In Santa Fe's Shadow:
The SEC's Pursuitof ManagerialAccountability, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 449, 481-83
(2001) (discussing how sunk cost trap and over-optimism bias may affect
corporate officers' decision-making process); O'Connor, supra note 82, at 1253,
1278 (discussing group tendency to throw good money at bad problems).
91. See Langevoort, supra note 90, at 482. This may explain why the Enron
board so quickly waived Enron's conflict of interest rules with respect to
financial activities of the CFO, Fastow. If they felt time was of the essence or
they were overly optimistic about Fastow's ability to increase Enron's earnings,
they may have been willing to overlook what appeared to be a clear conflict of
interest in his dealings with Enron. See O'Connor, supra note 82, at 1268-69,
1296-97. This may also explain why bankruptcy judges make some of the
rulings LoPucki brands as corrupt. Because bankruptcy courts want firms to
successfully reorganize under Chapter 11, it is possible that some may
authorize critical vendor payments or approve retention plans or bonuses if they
conclude that the alternative is a failed reorganization.
92. See Bainbridge, supra note 89, at 32; O'Connor, supra note 82, at 1257-
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unintentionally make harmful decisions, 93 and laws that
fail to consider those biases may not give directors an
incentive to change how they make decisions. Stated
differently, if directors will not acknowledge that their
decisions or decision-making process are unreasonable,
irrational, or illegal, they will not be deterred by a civil fine
that likely will be covered by director and officer liability
insurance.
C. DebarringDirectorsof Insolvent Firms
Corrupt, greedy, or lazy directors (who may think they
are unlikely to be caught) or incompetent or behaviorallyimpaired directors (who may not comprehend that their
actions are wrong) would have an incentive to change their
behavior only if the potential sanction is significant and
cannot be covered by insurance or otherwise passed on to
the shareholders. 94 There should be a rebuttable
presumption that the directors of insolvent 95 firms are unfit
for board service and should be barred from current and
future boards. This presumption would give directors a
greater incentive to loosen the grips failed managers have
on their jobs and their companies, 96 both before and after a
bankruptcy filing. While serving on the board of an
insolvent company should not be a per se disqualifier for
future board service, a firm's insolvency is an appropriate
triggering event because investors, creditors (especially
unsecured creditors), and employees inevitably are harmed
by a firm's insolvency. In addition, presumptively declaring
93. Or, why ethical and otherwise competent bankruptcy judges allow some
practices that may appear to be corrupt to an outsider observer like LoPucki.
94. Directors typically can seek direct payment under a director and officer
(D&O) liability insurance policy if the firm does not, or cannot, fully reimburse
or indemnify them for litigation expenses relating to their duties as directors of
the firm. See Nan Roberts Eitel, Now You Have it, Now You Don't: Directors'
and Officers' InsuranceAfter a CorporateBankruptcy, 46 LOY. L. REV. 585, 588
(2000); Melanie K. Palmore, Comment, "Insured vs. Insured" Exclusions in
Director and Officer Liability Insurance Policies: Is Coverage Available When
Chapter 11 Trustees and Debtors-in-Possession Sue Former Directors and
Officers?, 9 BANKR. DEV. J. 101, 105-06 (1992).
95. For the purposes of the proposed unfitness test, I define insolvent to
mean any business that files a bankruptcy petition, is placed in a receivership,
or lacks the current ability to pay its debts.
96. LoPucKi, supranote 1, at 139, 143-51.
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directors unfit and removing them from board service also
would alleviate the competitive pressure judges face when
deciding whether to allow those managers to control the
firm during the bankruptcy proceeding. This would also
eliminate the appearance that courts are allowing
managers to escape the consequences of their pre-petition
harmful conduct.
The primary goal of a disqualification sanction should
be to protect future businesses from intentional harm.
Thus, the debarring authority should not automatically
debar directors 97 simply because they served on the board of
an insolvent company or because the authority wants to
punish them for actions that already are punishable under
other civil or criminal statutes. 98 There should be an
irrebuttable presumption that a director is unfit to serve on
current or future boards only if the debarring authority
concludes that a director of an insolvent business is corrupt,
greedy, lazy, or incompetent, and poses a risk of continuing
to engage in harmful conduct. Although it is practiced in
other nations, the debarment sanction should not be used
simply to punish directors whose behavioral flaws or lax
oversight may have caused the company's insolvency. 99
97. It would be unwise to enact, and difficult to rationalize, a law that
automatically barred all directors of insolvent businesses from current or future
board service if they did not benefit from the misbehavior and did not
intentionally cause harm to the firm. For example, it would be inappropriate to
bar a director from current or future board service who unintentionally engaged
in a single act of misconduct (for example, breaching the duty of care) but did
not profit from the misconduct. The debarring authority should have the power
to debar directors from current or future board service only upon motion of an
interested party, which would include a bankruptcy trustee or examiner, a
receiver, a creditor, a shareholder, or the court sua sponte.
98. Thus, if the director or officer already could be barred from serving as a
director under the Remedies Act, there would be no need to bring a debarment
action based on the proposal discussed in this article. See Carrie Johnson, ExEnron Official Pleads Guilty, WASH. POST, May 20, 2004, at E4 (discussing
terms of guilty plea by Enron insider for insider trading which included
returning retention bonus and debarment from serving as an officer or director
of a public company).
99. See A. Mechele Dickerson, The Many Faces of Chapter 11: A Reply to
Professor Baird, 12 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 109, 128 n.95 (2003) (discussing
director liability under non-US laws). For a more comprehensive discussion of
director liability under British and Australian law, see Vanessa Finch, The
Recasting of Insolvency Law, 68 MOD. L. REV. 713 (2005); Paul James et al.,
Insolvent Trading-An Empirical Study (Univ. of Melbourne Legal Studies
Research, Working Paper No. 72, 2004), www.ssrn.com/abstract=555892.
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When deciding how to determine whether to grant a
motion to declare a director unfit and remove her from
current or future board service, a state or federal court or
agency (the "debarring authority") 100 should apply the
factors courts consider when deciding whether to disqualify
directors who have violated federal securities laws. 10 1
Specifically, the debarring authority should consider:
* the nature of the misconduct that caused the
firm's insolvency;
* whether the director knowingly or willingly
participated in the harmful conduct;
• whether there is recidivist behavior, i.e, repeat
violations of the law, service on the board of more
than one insolvent business, or multiple past
breaches of fiduciary duties;
* the amount of loss the insolvency caused
creditors or investors; and
* whether, or how much, the director profited as a
result of the firm's insolvency.
Clearly, corrupt directors who intentionally delay a
bankruptcy filing to give themselves (or corporate officers)
additional time to exercise stock options, take out loans
from the firm, give themselves bonuses, collect consulting
fees, or otherwise loot the company, should be deemed unfit
because of greed. 10 2 In contrast, if a director joined the
100. Laws should be implemented by the U.S. Congress (for example, as
part of the Federal Bankruptcy Code or federal securities laws) and by the
individual states to prevent a disqualified director from moving from state to
state to avoid a state bar. This would also prevent a disqualifid director from
serving on the board of a private company when he has been disqualified from
serving on the board of a publicly traded company.
101. See Jayne W. Barnard, Rule 10b-5 and the "Unfitness" Question, 47
ARIz. L. REV. 9, 41-58 (2005) (discussing which violators of Rule 10b-5 should be
deemed unfit).
102. The facts surrounding the Enron filing demonstrate that directors may
have delayed the filing to protect their pecuniary interests as many of them
netted millions by strategically exercising stock options and then selling shares.
See Michael Duffy, What Did They Know and... When Did They Know It?, TIME,
Jan. 28, 2002, at 16. To decrease the likelihood of removing generally fit
directors who, because of behavioral biases, believed they could save the firm,
courts should ask whether the directors delayed filing a bankruptcy petition (or
resisted a receivership) and whether the delay or resistance was intentional,
negligent, or resulted from behavioral biases.
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board of an insolvent firm before it filed for bankruptcy but
after the harmful acts occurred, the director should not be
barred from current or future board service. A director who
engaged in (or failed to perform) acts due to a behavioral
bias but did not intend to harm the firm should be treated
differently from corrupt directors. These directors should be
allowed to remain on current or future boards if they can
convince the court that they pose no future risk to
businesses because, for example, the firm has created an
effective corporate compliance program, or the director
consents to serving only on boards that have such
programs. Directors also should be allowed to serve on
boards if they have taken other steps, including
participating in more extensive board training, to ensure
that they are fit to serve on a board.
1. Benefits of DebarringDirectors.Allowing a debarring
authority to bar unfit directors should protect the public by
deterring future misconduct by both an individual
misbehaving director (i.e., specific deterrence) and by the
potentially misbehaving directors of other businesses (i.e.,
general deterrence). 10 3 Moreover, while LoPucki cites no
proof that Ken Lay actually participated in the decision to
hire his replacement (an experienced turnaround manager),
having the "Ken Lays" of the business world and the
directors who allowed them to commit allegedly fraudulent
acts declared unfit would help reduce the appearance that
bankruptcy courts are letting corporate thieves control the
firm's bankruptcy case.10 4 Permitting debarring authorities
to declare directors unfit and disqualify them from future
board service also would indirectly serve as a financial
penalty, since debarred directors would be forced to forfeit
future directors' fees. Also, being labeled unfit5 might impair
their own future employment opportunities. 10

103. See Barnard, supra note 69, at 1494-95 (discussing the effect of specific
and general deterrence).
104. LoPuCKi, supra note 1, at 145-48.
105. While outside corporate directors typically do not derive their principal
income from directors' fees, they nonetheless can earn fees and benefits that
exceed $100,000 annually. See Neil Weinberg, Blame the Board, FORBES, May
10, 2004, at 120 (reporting $138,000 as the average annual compensation for
independent directors at Cendant in 2004). Although the total annual
compensation for directors in 2001 was approximately $41,000, Enron directors
were paid in excess of $300-400,000 in cash and stock that year. See
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Because a director's reputation may be one of his most
important assets and companies choose their chief officers
and board members largely based on their reputations, the
fear of being labeled unfit would give most directors an
incentive to make better decisions. 106 That is, the risk of a
"shaming" sanction that labels a director as unfit should
encourage directors to avoid making decisions that
presumptively trigger the sanction. 107 If the sanction is
widely publicized, 10 8 it also should serve as a deterrent to
directors who have behavioral traits that might cause them
to unintentionally harm the firm. To be sure, even
commentators who have advocated shaming sanctions
concede that it is "hardly an exact science."' 09 Despite this,
a shaming sanction that also imposes a financial loss
should be more effective in protecting future businesses
than imposing monetary damages because a shaming
sanction can more easily be tailored to the nature of the

KORN/FERRY INT'L, 28TH ANNUAL BOARD OF DIRECTORS STUDY 17 (2001); Abelson,

supra note 55, at Cl; Editorial, 'Yes Men' Make Up Boards That Miss EnronType Failings,USA TODAY, Feb. 21, 2002, at 16A [hereinafter Yes Men]. Other
firms had similar or sometimes significantly higher compensation plans for
their directors. See Gary Strauss, Corporate Perks Add Zing to Juicy Jobs on
Boards, USA TODAY, Apr. 17, 2000, at 3B (reporting $645,700 annual fee to
Microsoft directors, $386,320 to Dell directors, and $341,900 to Goldman Sachs
directors).
106. Of course, market controls may not always prevent directors from
making bad decisions because not all markets are efficient and information
about the past acts of directors is often not readily available to shareholders
who would be required to vote to remove the arguably unfit director. See, e.g.,
Diedre A. Burgman & Paul N. Cox, CorporateDirectors,CorporateRealities and
DeliberativeProcess: An Analysis of the Trans Union Case, 11 J. CORP. L. 311,
354-58 (1996); Michael C. Jensen, The Modern IndustrialRevolution, Exit, and
the Failure of Internal Control Systems, 48 J. FIN. 831, 851-53 (1993). See
generally Cohen, supra note 54.
107. In theory, directors who intentionally harm businesses will be shunned
by their peers for violating cultural norms and will feel guilt or shame. See
David A. Skeel, Jr., Shaming in Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1811, 1821
(2001).
108. Directors of successful firms often are recognized and commended in
the popular press and this recognition both enhances the directors' self-esteem
and leads to potentially more lucrative social or professional opportunities. See
Louis Lavelle, Best and Worst Boards, Bus. WK., Oct. 7, 2002, at 104. Ironically,
in 2000, the Chief Executive magazine ranked Enron's board among the top five
boards. Yes Men, supra note 105, at 16A.
109. Skeel, supra note 107, at 1854.

2006]

WORDS THAT WOUND

395

directors' misbehavior. 110 In addition, it is virtually
impossible for directors to pass the cost of a shaming
sanction on to the company or its shareholders. Because
most large and mid-sized businesses carry director and
officer liability insurance that directors can use to pay civil
fines, unless directors are implicated in aberrational cases
like Enron or WorldCom, directors likely will not be forced
to bear the full costs associated with a financial penalty for
breaching a state fiduciary duty law.1 ' In contrast, even if
a firm agrees to pay the directors' costs to defend against a
motion to debar, if the director is found unfit to serve on a
current or future board, the firm cannot absorb that cost
because a personal shaming sanction is something only the
individual director can "pay."
While directors should not be discouraged from having
a trusting relationship with managers, 112 they should
routinely seek external assistance when they are asked to
approve unusual financial transactions. The risk of being
labeled unfit, and the desire to have a defense to such an
action, should cause directors to demand more detailed
information about the company's true financial condition
110. See id. Even if shunning or shaming may sometimes enforce business
norms, without legal sanctions, they are unlikely to modify the behavior of
corrupt directors, especially if they can reap enormous profits from their
decisions. Indeed, just as market pressures are unlikely to prevent directors
from engaging in misconduct if the benefits of the misconduct are significant,
norms are unlikely to prevent directors from taking (or refraining from taking)
actions that harm the business if the financial benefit of betrayal substantially
outweighs the costs associated with violating those norms. See Blair & Stout,
supra note 64, at 318-19 (questioning effectiveness of trust and integrity to
prevent directors from behaving in opportunistic ways); see also Coffee, supra
note 58, at 34 (suggesting that the increasingly lucrative consulting income
auditors hoped to receive from clients may have caused their "normal desire to
preserve their reputational capital for the long run [to] become subordinated to
their desire to obtain extraordinary returns in the short run by risking that
reputational capital.").
111. See Bernard S. Black, et al., Outside Directors and Lawsuits: What are
the Real Risks?, McKINSEY Q., Autumn 2004, at 70, available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=590913; Lucian Bebchuk, What's $13 Million Among
Friends, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 2005, at A17.
112. While it is unclear whether board friendships threaten board
independence and pose harm to shareholder interests, adversarial relationships
between boards and firm officers generally are counterproductive. See
Langevoort, supra note 81, at 813. But cf. O'Connor, supra note 82, at 1246
(suggesting that "Fictive Friendships" among board members creates a social
norm that prevents them from challenging managers).
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and the risks associated with certain acts. 113 The threat of
being found unfit will also give them an incentive to seek
advice from neutral, external financial experts, 114 to insist
that a director with a certain type of expertise be added to
the board, or to create a formal corporate compliance
program." 5 Ultimately, this should help bridge the
inherent information disparity between the officers and the
directors-a disparity that will be especially wide if
directors are financially unsophisticated or otherwise prone
to defer to management decisions." 6

113. Many directors tend to be highly deferential toward the company's
officers and often will not carefully monitor the officers unless there is some
type of crisis. See, e.g., JAY W. LORSCH WITH ELIZABETH MACIVER, PAWNS OR
POTENTATES: THE REALITY OF AMERICA'S CORPORATE BOARDS 41-49 (1989); Alexei
Barrionuevo, The Rise of the Boards, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 2005, at C1 (quoting
the former head of the Securities and Exchange Commission that board
members traditionally were "reluctant to challenge chief executives and their
strategies.").
114. Directors already seek (then use as a liability shield) the advice of
investment bankers when considering whether a merger or takeover is "fair" to
shareholders and obtain "solvency opinions" when they seek additional capital
or are in merger discussions. See, e.g., Bayer Corp. v. MasoTech, Inc., 269 F.3d
726, 734 (6th Cir. 2001); Brandt v. Hicks, Muse & Co., 208 B.R. 288 (Bankr. D.
Mass. 1997); see also Helen M. Bowers, Fairness Opinions and the Business
Judgment Rule: An Empirical Investigation of Target Firms' Use of Fairness
Opinions, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 567, 569-70 (2002); William J. Carney, Fairness
Opinions: How Fair are They and Why We Should Do Nothing About It, 70
WASH. U. L.Q. 523, 525 (1992).
115. See In re Caremark Int'l Inc., 698 A.2d 959, 970 (Del. Ch. 1996)
(concluding that directors have a duty to assure that a competent corporate
information and reporting system is in place and that the failure to create one
may subject a director to liability). These programs also protect firms who are
convicted of violating criminal laws since firms can decrease their sentences if
they can prove that the business had a well-designed and effective compliance
program. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8A1.2 (2002).
116. Officers, like directors, likely will be concerned about their reputation
and may be more reluctant to accurately portray the company's finances if they
fear that an accurate portrait may jeopardize their compensation or tenure with
the company. See Christine E. L. Tan, The Asymmetric Information Content of
Going-Concern Opinions - Evidence from Bankrupt Firms With and Without
Prior Distress Indicators (Apr. 2002), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstractid=313025. See generally ABA Task Force on Corporate Responsibility,
PreliminaryReport of the ABA Task Force on CorporateResponsibility, 58 Bus.
LAW. 189, 201 (2002) (recommending that boards maintain a program of
director training and education and that they adopt procedures to evaluate the
effectiveness of meetings and the information flow to directors).

2006]

WORDS THAT WOUND

397

2. Risks of Debarring Directors. Perhaps the most
compelling argument against barring unfit directors from
board service is the risk that this sanction will cause
desirable directors to refuse board service, will skew
decisions by forcing directors to be overly cautious, or will
cause the costs of directors and officers insurance to
skyrocket. 117 While the risk of disqualification does not
appear to have altered the willingness of directors to serve
(or the decisions they made while serving) on the boards of
non-US businesses, 118 the chilling effect is a legitimate
concern. Directors tend to hold prominent positions with
other companies and appear to overreact to legal
interventions to avoid being subjected to prolonged
litigation. Given this, they may become overly cautious even
if they believe they have done nothing wrong because they
117. When state courts appeared willing to increase director liability in
breach of care lawsuits (during the height of the D&O insurance crisis in the
mid-1980s) and when the SEC proposed additional disclosure requirements for
audit committees, directors reportedly resigned or were less willing to join
corporate boards. See, e.g., DENNIS J. BLOCK ET AL., THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT
RULE: FIDUCIARY DUTIES OF CORPORATE DIRECTORS 2174 nn.1837-39 (5th ed.
1998); Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Divergence of Standards of Conduct and
Standards of Review in CorporateLaw, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 437, 459-60; Park
McGinty, The Twilight of Fiduciary Duties: On the Need for Shareholder SelfHelp in an Age of Formalistic Proceduralism, 46 EMORY L.J. 163, 305 (1997);
Palmore, supra note 94, at 104; Ramesh K. S. Rao et al., Fiduciary Duty e la
Lyonnais: An Economic Perspective on Corporate Governance in a FinanciallyDistressed Firm, 22 J. CORP. L. 53, 57, 61 (1996); Gregory S. Rowland, Earnings
Management, The SEC, and Corporate Governance: Director Liability Arising
from the Audit Committee Report, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 168, 202 n.144 (2002).
Recently, some potential directors appear to have resisted joining boards in the
wake of the Enron and WorldCom scandals, and D&O insurance premiums
appear to have increased as well. See Christopher Oster, Directors' Insurance
Fees Get Fatter, WALL ST. J., July 12, 2002, at Cl; Susan Stellin, Directors
Ponder New Tougher Rules, N.Y. TIMES, June. 30, 2002, at BU16; Stephen
Taub, Enron Insurance Fallout: D&O Premium Surge, CFO Online, Feb. 22,
2002, http://www.cfo.com/Article?article=6697. It is unclear, however, whether
the multi-million dollar settlements the Enron and WorldCom directors paid
out of their own pockets have deterred competent directors from serving on
boards, or whether directors view the Enron and Worldcom settlements as
aberrational. See Ben White, Directors Run Risk of Paying Penalties Out of
Their Pockets, WASH. POST, Jan. 20, 2005, at El.
118. A survey of disqualified directors suggests that the potential bar to
board service had no chilling effect on directors' willingness to serve or their
willingness to take risks while serving largely because most directors were
unaware that they could be disqualified for their conduct. See Andrew Hicks,
Disqualificationof Directors:No Hiding Place for the Unfit?, 59 RES. REP. 1, 10
(1998).
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want to avoid the delays associated with litigation, the
exposure of potentially embarrassing facts, and the shame
associated with potentially being labeled unfit.119
To be sure, companies need directors who are willing to
take reasonable risks because risks are an essential
condition for promoting and advancing corporate profits.
Moreover, a proposal to label the directors of all insolvent
firms as unfit would be draconian and most certainly would
cause some qualified individuals to refuse to serve on
boards. 120 If, however, directors understand the factors that
would cause them to be found unfit for future board service
and they know the defenses they can raise to an unfitness
charge, fit directors (or behaviorally-impaired directors who
may unintentionally harm firms) can predict ex ante when
they run the risk of being deemed unfit for service. Given
this, and assuming most directors are rational, the
debarment risk should not cause a fit, rational director to
either refuse to serve on boards or to make overly cautious
decisions. 121
In addition to the potential chilling effect, barring
directors from current and future board service will
increase both public and private costs. Public costs would
include those associated with the initial debarment process
itself,122 the cost to maintain a filing registry (or a series of

119. See Langevoort, supra note 81, at 823.
120. Given the homogeneity of most corporate boards, an unintended
consequence of this proposal may be that some "traditional" directors (i.e., white
males in their fifties) may refuse to serve on boards which may open up board
opportunities for more racial minorities and women. See generally O'Connor,
supra note 82, at 1246 (discussing homogeneous, "clubby nature" of corporate

boards).
121. Some commentators have questioned whether the Enron and
WorldCom directors' settlements would discourage otherwise qualified people
from serving on corporate boards. See Bebchuk, supra note 111, at A17; White,
supra note 117, at El; White, supra note 12, at El; see also E. Norman Veasey,
A Perspective on Liability Risks to Directors,DIRECTORS MONTHLY, Feb. 2005, at

1 where the former chief justice of the Delaware Supreme Court argues that
directors' personal wealth rarely will be at risk because of the business
judgment rule and because they can protect themselves with their own diligence
and independence.
122. It would not be cost-prohibitive to require trustees to file a brief report
noting that they have no reason to believe the directors are unfit. However, one
of the reasons I do not suggest that the law require trustees or receivers to
submit a detailed report on the fitness of directors in each case, even if there is
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registries) to record the names of all debarred directors, and
the costs incurred to sanction a director who violates a bar
order. Private costs would include the costs businesses will
incur to investigate whether potential directors are fit or
have been barred from board service, the directors' costs to
defend against an unfitness finding and debarment, the
costs associated with creating or enhancing corporate
compliance programs, and the costs to hire external
experts.
Although the process of barring unfit directors from
serving on future boards would not be cost-free, not
debarring directors also imposes costs. Existing laws
allowed the directors involved with the recent corporate
accounting scandals discussed in Courting Failureto make
decisions that harmed those companies, and some of those
directors still remain on other corporate boards.123
Moreover, as LoPucki stresses, there are direct and indirect
costs associated
with the bankruptcy proceedings
themselves. 124 The existing proposal obviously will not
eliminate all costs created by insolvency proceedings.
However, the risk of being found unfit for service should
decrease the number of overall inefficient insolvencies by
forcing competent directors to pay greater attention to the
management of their business (by, for example, considering

no indication that the directors appear to be unfit (as is required under British
law), is to curtail administrative costs. Cf. Sarbanes-Oxley Act, supra note 57, §
307 (requiring lawyers to report evidence that a company or its agents have
materially violated securities laws or breached fiduciary duties even if the
lawyer has not concluded that any actual wrongdoing has occurred).
123. See Ben White, Blame for Scandals Entering the Boardroom, WASH.

POST, Jan. 7, 2005, at El (noting that some former Enron and WorldCom
directors continued to serve on the boards of Owens Corning, Lockheed Martin
Corp., and Wyeth).
124. Direct costs are the transaction costs of the bankruptcy case, primarily
lawyer, accountant,

and other

professional

fees.

See Edward S.

Adams,

Governance in Chapter 11 Reorganizations: Reducing Costs, Improving Results,
73 B.U. L. REV. 581, 607 (1993). LoPucki observes that these costs can be
substantial, though they appear to be considerably less than earlier suspected.
See LOPuCKI, supra note 1, at 140, 143; see also Stephen J. Lubben, The Direct
Costs of Corporate Reorganization: An Empirical Examination of Professional

Fees in Large Chapter 11 Cases, 74 AM. BANKR. L.J. 509, 515 (2000) (concluding
that direct costs in large reorganizations are approximately two percent of firm
assets); Lawrence A. Weiss, Bankruptcy Resolution: Direct Costs and Violation
of Priority of Claims, 27 J. FIN. ECON. 285, 286 (1990) (placing costs at three
percent of assets).
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ways to prevent an insolvency) or by preventing corrupt or
otherwise unfit directors from serving on boards (and, thus,
protecting
future
solvent
businesses
from
these
directors). 125 Either result should ultimately lead to a
decrease in the costs associated with future business
insolvencies.
CONCLUSION

Whether or not you agree with LoPucki's basic premise
that bankruptcy courts have been corrupted by competition
for big cases, it is undisputed that his book has had a
dramatic effect on the bankruptcy dialogue about venue for
large cases. Hopefully, the conversation will move beyond
the wounding word "corrupt" and will focus on identifying
the costs and benefits associated with the changes that
have taken place in Chapter 11 since 1978. Likewise, the
publicity
surrounding
Courting Failure and
its
controversial claims hopefully will cause legislators to
consider additional ways to defeat corrupt management
practices.

125. The risk of being debarred for failing to protect the firm's interests
hopefully will cause directors to file earlier bankruptcy petitions. Even if a firm
files a Chapter 11 reorganization petition, but ultimately liquidates in Chapter
11, an earlier filing should better preserve the value of the firm and allow it
either to be a more successful reorganization (which will benefit employees,
trade creditors, suppliers, and the local community) or a more efficient
liquidation that provides a higher return for creditors. See Dickerson, supra
note 47, at 30 n.109; see also H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 233-34 (1978), as
reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6193 ("One of the problems that the
Bankruptcy Commission recognized in current bankruptcy and reorganization
practice is that debtors too often wait too long to seek bankruptcy relief.").

